



# General Aspects of U.S. Air Emissions Cap and Trade Programs

Presentation for
Centro de Estudios Públicos
by
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Office of Air and Radiation

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#### **Federal Programs**

- Acid Rain Program (ARP)
- NO<sub>x</sub> Budget Trading Program (NBP)
- Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
- Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR)
- Clean Air Visibility Rule (CAVR)
- Clear Skies and Other Multi-Pollutant Legislation

#### **Other Programs**


- Ozone Transport Commission
- Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM)
- Western Regional Air Partnership
- Chicago VOC Program
- Houston/Galveston Emission Allowance Program (NO<sub>x</sub>)
- RGGI
- EU Emissions Trading Scheme





- Air emission cap(s) are set for pollution sources in defined area
- Allowances to emit are allocated to sources in amount not to exceed the cap
- Sources must hold allowances to cover emissions
- Tailored monitoring records source emissions
- Programs rest on reasonable technical and analytic foundations
- All emissions and allowance holdings are <u>routinely</u> recorded, reported and made publicly available
- Sources can "trade" allowances and may "bank" them
- There are automatic penalties and other enforcement sanctions
- Assessment is conducted to see whether the program is working

# Results of Acid Rain Program: Major Reductions in SO<sub>2</sub> Emissions and Acid Rain




SO<sub>2</sub> emissions from power plants down by 5.5 million tons since 1990




Acid rain cut by 25 - 40%

Million Tons of SO<sub>2</sub>

Sulfate
(Acid Rain)
Concentrations





Substantial health, visibility, and other benefits provided




# Summertime NO<sub>x</sub> Emission Reductions


## 2005 NBP states' ozone season reductions (May 1 – September 30)

- 372% from 1990 baseline
- 357% from 2000 baseline
- **3**11% from 2004

#### Total NBP Ozone Season NOx Emissions



### Daily Emission Trends for NOx Budget Trading Program Units in 2003, 2004 and 2005



Source: EPA, 2006








- Certainty that a specific emission level will be achieved
- Emissions measurement and reporting is emphasized for complete accountability
- More regulatory certainty and compliance flexibility
- Fewer administrative resources needed by industry and government (if kept simple)
  - Lower permitting and transaction costs for sources
- Promotes innovation and early reductions with banking
- Compatible with other mechanisms to ensue local protection
- Lower costs this also makes further improvements feasible
- Need for formal enforcement procedures is minimized






#### Acid Rain Program: Projected Annual Costs at **Full Implementation in 2010**



All estimates cover the SO<sub>2</sub> trading program and do not cover the NO<sub>2</sub> program which EPA recently estimated annually cost about \$ 1.1 billion (in 2006 \$).









- Programs cover industries with wide variation in compliance options and costs that have capability to monitor and report emissions reliably
- Cap on emissions Government issues a fixed quantity of allowances
  - Focuses on environmental goal
  - Limits creation of "paper credits" and "anyway tons"
  - Provides certainty to allowance market
- Full sector coverage all sources (existing and new) included
  - Minimizes shifting of production and emissions ("leakage")
  - Achieves emission reduction goal without case-by-case review
- Strong monitoring accurate and complete measurement and reporting
  - Assures accountability and program <u>credibility</u>
- Unrestricted trading and banking –complemented by source-specific limits where needed to protect local air quality
  - Allows companies to choose compliance options
  - Addresses "hotspots" with added direct controls, if they emerge
  - Reduces costs








- Annual reconciliation: Actual emissions compared to allowances in accounts
- Penalties for non-compliance
  - SO<sub>2</sub> Program:
    - Automatic offset (deduct allowance from next year's allocation) keeps "environment whole"
    - Automatic inflation-indexed financial penalty (about \$3,000 per ton of SO<sub>2</sub> in 2005)
    - Possible civil and criminal penalties
  - NBP, CAIR and CAMR Programs
    - 3 allowances surrendered for each ton from next year's account (no automatic monetary penalty)
    - Possible civil and criminal penalties
- 99.9% compliance rate for both ARP and NBP programs
  - Penalties have ranged from \$3,000 to \$1,500,000




# Pollution Controls in Place in the Power Industry 2020 with Addition of CAIR/CAMR/CAVR











Source: EPA, 2005







- It works!
- Greatest reductions occur where the greatest emissions exist
  - This inoculates programs against "hot spots"
- Trading provides broad regional reductions, but often should be considered with direct controls to strike right balance
- Innovation happens!
- Clarity of purpose, simplicity, and flexibility of trading and banking have combined to not only save money, but to provide:
  - Lower administrative efforts to manage regulatory programs
  - High level of compliance
  - More environmental protection
- Keep it simple
- Caps protect the environment, not allowance allocation



# Programs Designed for Compliance



### • Key Compliance Elements:

- Accountability
- Simplicity of design and operation
- Incentives for data accuracy and completeness
- Communications and outreach
- Continuous improvement



- Accurate and complete emissions measurement
  - Solid government quality assurance and verification
  - 100% of the CEMS units are audited
  - Statistical analyses used to identify "suspicious" units
  - Targeted field audits
- Standardization of emissions and quality assurance data
- Transparency of emissions and trading information
- Predictable consequences for noncompliance -Automatic penalties

### Simplicity of design and operation



- Minimal, but effective government role
  - About 30 analysts implement both Acid Rain and NOx Budget programs
- Implementation and compliance
  - Centralized
  - Integrated
- Simple and easily understood rules
  - Guidance documents that explain the rules

# Incentives for data accuracy and completeness

- Incomplete or inaccurate data translates into financial consequences
  - Data substitution procedures
  - Frequency of testing
- Monitoring flexibility without compromising accuracy
  - Several monitoring approaches
  - Petition process

### Communication and Outreach



- Annual monitoring conference serves as forum to report to stakeholders
- Training workshops for states and sources
- Daily communications with sources
  - Resolution of data issues or testing requirements
- Open discussions relating to policy changes or rule interpretation
- Strive for environment of trust and collaboration


### Continuous Improvement



- Including ad-hoc checks and indicators of possible problems
- Getting sources to "audit themselves"
  - Some audit software is available to sources

 A solid monitoring program can be achieved over time is program design allows for it

### Summary



- Success has been largely due to many years of implementing comprehensive and strict, yet realistic monitoring, reporting and verification requirements, based on sound principles
- These principles, if followed, can work for other programs