Emissions trading in Chile?

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Context for an ETS in Chile

- Growing open economy
- Strong institutions
- Energy sector profile
 - Split grid
 - Fossil fuel dependency
 - High energy prices
- Relatively small number of large market players in key sectors (energy, industry)
- High levels of inequality
- Past experience with market mechanisms
- Unclear forestry sector mitigation potential
- Agricultural emissions low

Integrated prototype for an ETS in an emerging economy

- Not a proposal but a starting point for discussion
- An integrated package for:
 - Sectoral coverage and point of obligation
 - Allocation
 - Phases based on linking and price control/stabilisation options

Rationale(s) for an ETS

Could be one or more of the following:

- 1. Concern about climate change and reducing emissions
- 2. Opportunity to generate revenue and leverage international climate finance
- 3. Response to international political/trade or consumer pressure
- 4. Co-benefits

International market scenarios



Spectrum for ETS design

Capped ETS with full linking

International market sets the price

Domestic-only ETS with price control

Government sets the price

In the current world...

Selling units could generate revenue for Chile, but:

- Full selling linkages could bring high prices with high adjustment costs – but also high price risk.
- A low initial price can drive long-term transformation if the future direction of pricing is signalled clearly and credibly.



Sectoral coverage and point of obligation

Start with:

Stationary energy and transport Obligation at point of fuel production/import

Industrial processes – cement, lime and steel Obligation at point of emissions

Forestry (reforestation) Landowner obligation

Allocation

Allocation can affect distribution of gains / burden and price (and liquidity)

Four objectives for allocation

- 1. Reduce leakage (fugas) by lowering price pressure
- 2. Smooth transition
- 3. Participation and compliance
- 4. Equity

Allocation

Grandparenting

- Compensation for stranded assets
- Can address equity and political issues
- Fixed total amount spread over a number of years

Output-based free allocation

- Strongly emissions-intensive and trade-exposed sectors only
- Phased out over a fixed period of time

Auction

- Can address equity
- Provided throughout for liquidity and price discovery
- Ramps up as free allocation is phased out

ETS design process

Policy development



Education and engagement Research

First policy questions

- 1. Rationale and objectives for an ETS?
- 2. When and how do you want to sell units on the international market?
- 3. Does the government want to control or manage domestic prices?
- 4. What point of obligation should apply in the stationary energy sector?

Policy development process is iterative



Add new questions

- What sectors should be covered?
- What are your objectives with respect to the allocation of units?
 - Equity, smooth transition, leakage, participation and compliance

An effective ETS requires:

- 1. Clearly defined objectives
- 2. Tailor the design for national circumstances
- 3. Keep a long-term perspective but manage transitional impacts
- 4. Bring stakeholders along with the policy process
- 5. Design a robust and resilient ETS that is adaptable to an uncertain future

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